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In this article we estimate the hazard function (takeover probabilities) for firms that are targets in
unsolicited tender offers. The data support a Weibull-gamma specification and imply a hazard
rate that increases sharply in the initial period following the bid announcement, after which it
declines steadily. In explaining the hazard, we find that the initial bid premium has no explanatory
power, but the onset of an auction and the proportion of institutional ownership In the target firm
significantly enhance the hazard. Legal and financial restructuring actions by target management
are effective in reducing the hazard, thereby prolonging the contest.
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portant from several perspectives. Previous empirical work
has ignored this important time dimension in takeover con
tests.
We use three parametric models to estimate the hazard
function conditional on defensive actions by management
and various target-firm characteristics. The shape parame
ter(s) of the hazard function determine(s) how the instanta
neous probability that a target firm will be taken over changes
over the duration of the contest. The scale parameters, in
fluenced by the regressors, indicate how this probability dif
fers across firms at any given point in time. Furthermore,
MacKinnon (1992) stressed that, because parameter esti
mates are sensitive to the choice of the model, highly mis
leading inferences may be reached if the underlying model
specification is incorrect. Consequently, we implement sev
eral model-specification tests and find that our data support
a Weibull-gamma specification.
The estimated hazard increases sharply in the initial pe
riod following the bid announcement, after which it declines
steadily. Of the defensive action measures, legal defense and
financial restructuring are significant. We find that both vari
ables reduce the hazard and are, therefore, instrumental in
prolonging the contest. As regards target-firm characteris
tics, the onset of an auction and the proportion of institu
tional ownership enhance the hazard. The initial bid pre
mium and regulatory intervention do not appear to affect the
hazard.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: In Sec
tion I, we outline the estimation and specification testing
procedures involving duration models. In Section 2, we de
scribe the data-collection procedure and sample characteris
tics. In Section 3, we describe our model search and present
diagnostic test results. In Section 4, we present the parameter
estimates and interpretation of the results. In Section 5, we
make our concluding comments.

A problem common to many fields of inquiry concerns the
length of time that an individual spends in a particular state
and the probability, given this length of time (or duration),
of his exiting that state. Duration models are used to ex
plain how individual characteristics affect this duration and
how the elapsed duration affects the chances of exiting that
state. Such models have long been used in the engineering
and medical fields; more recently they have been used in la
bor economics to analyze unemployment and strike durations
[see Lawless (1982) and Kiefer (1988) for comprehensive
surveys].
In this article, we apply duration models to the analy
sis of the length of time between the initiation of an un
solicited bid for a firm and the resolution of the resulting
takeover contest. The duration of the contest is of impor
tance to several interested parties. For example, the Secu
rities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) is required, under
the Williams Act, to draft and enforce rules relating to no
tice and waiting periods in tender offers and the withdrawal
time allowed to stockholders. The legislative intent is to have
the S.E.C. design rules that enable target-firm stockholders
to make informed decisions when confronted with a tender
offer.
Other interested parties include bidders who would like
to end the contest as quickly as possible to exploit what
ever synergies they have spotted and to deter third parties
from entering with higher bids. Target management, on the
other hand, would prefer to delay the process so as to en
hance their action set, possibly through the erection of bar
riers to protect their own jobs/perquisites (managerial en
trenchment), or to generate an auction so that stockholders
get the best possible deal. Furthermore, risk arbitrageurs
are interested in cashing out their positions at the optimal
point in the takeover contest so as to maximize returns.
Consequently, the duration of the takeover contest is im
113
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1. METHODOLOGY
In duration models, it is customary to specify the para
metric form of the model in terms of its hazard function
rather than the probability density function (pdf) even though
the two functions are mathematically equivalent. The haz
ard function h(t) = f(t)/ S(t), where /(t) is the pdf and
S(t) = P(T > t) is the survivor function of T, where T
represents the duration of the contest. The survivor function
evaluated at timet represents the probability that the firm will
not be taken over (will survive) until timet. Analogously, the
hazard specifies the instantaneous probability that the target
firm will be taken over at time t + Ct, for a very small 6,
given that it has survived up to timet. Duration dependence
exists when (d/dt)h(t) ::f 0, implying that the probability ofa
takeover is affected by the length of time spent in the contest.
Dependence is positive when (d/dt)h(t) > 0 and negative
when (d/dt)h(t) < 0.
For parametric estimation of duration models, one has to
specify the a priori functional form of the hazard function.
Duration models often employ the Weibull distribution as a
first pass, a convention we follow in this study. The hazard
function of the Weibull distribution conditional on the regres
sors X is
(1.1)
h(t;X) Jl.D:f''- 1 ,

=

where the scale parameter f.1. is typically taken as exp(XJ)) to
ensure the nonnegativity of the hazard function. The shape
parameter, a, allows for positive (a> 1), negative (a < 1),
or the absence (a= 1) of duration dependence. The Weibull
model, however, may be restrictive because it only allows
for monotonically increasing or decreasing hazard functions.
For instance, it does not allow for a takeover probability that
increases with time initially but falls thereafter. The survivor
function of a Wei bull model is
S(t;X)

=exp(- f.l.t").

(1.2)

A characteristic feature of duration models is that data on
durations are seldom complete. It is common for some ob
servations to be right censored because the event of interest
has not taken place by the end of the data-acquisition period.
In our sample, we follow each takeover contest for a period of
52 weeks. Ifat this point target firms have still not been taken
over, they are classified as remaining independent, thereby
representing right-censored observations. Our raw data, for
i = 1, ... , N, consist of durations, t;, regressors, X;, and indi
cator variable, C;, where C; 1 if the firm is taken over, 0 if
it remains independent (censored).
The following log-likelihood function incorporates com
plete as well as censored observations, where a right-censored
spell contributes a probability Pr(T > t) =S(t) rather than a
density to the function :

=

N

£

=L)C;in(f(t;;X;)) + (1 -

C;) ln(S(t;; X;))).

(1.3)

i:l

If the model is incorrectly specified, however, the estimates
obtained by maximizing any likelihood function may lead
to spurious inferences (MacKinnon 1992). It is, therefore,

crucial to test the validity of the given parametric model be
fore any meaningful inferences can be made.
Unlike the case of linear regression models, there is no
natural or automatic way of defining a residual that can be
used for testing duration models. Diagnostic tests in duration
models are generally based on the following transformation:
t:(t)

= -ln(S(t;X)).

(1.4)

Under the null hypothesis ofno model misspecification, t: has
a unit exponential distribution with

=exp( -t:) and E(t:1) =j!.
(1.5)
For a Weibull model, t:(t) =f.ll" . The parameters are replaced
S(t:)

by their maximum likelihood estimates to obtain generalized
residuals, €, for model evaluation (Lancaster 1985).
The property of t:, given by (1.5), is used for specifica
tion testing in duration models. An informal graphical test
consists of plotting - ln(S'(€)) against €, where S(€) is the
product-limit estimate of €. If the model is correctly spec
ified, the scatterplot clusters around a 45° line through the
origin (see Kiefer 1988; Lawless 1982). This test, which
works for censored data as well, is based on the visual in
spection of departures from the 45° line.
Generalized residuals are also used for more formal tests.
The conditional moment restriction tests based on E(ef) =j!
can easily be implemented using the Tauchen (1985) and
Newey (1985) framework. For a Weibull model, a test of
second-moment restriction, E(t:2) =2, has traditionally been
interpreted as a test for neglected heterogeneity, caused pri
marily by the omission of relevant regressors (see Kiefer
1988; Lancaster 1985). Jaggia (1991) showed that the out
come of this test can also be influenced by other types of
misspecifications. Therefore, we interpret this test as a gen
eral misspecification ("something is wrong") test rather than
a test for heterogeneity per se.
Given that some of our observations are right censored,
the preceding residuals have to be suitably adjusted. In our
sample, the observed duration is t = min[T, L], implying
that an observation is complete only if it is less than the
censoring time of L = 52 weeks. Note that t:(t) no longer
has a unit exponential distribution when data are censored.
The memoryless property of a unit exponential distribution
of t:(T), however, is used to derive the following result:
E(t:(T) IT> L) =t:(L) + E(t:(T)) =t:(L) + 1.

(1.6)

Therefore, the residuals are redefined as
e(t)

=€(t)

= €(t) + 1

. if uncensored
if censored.

(1 .7)

Even though the modified generalized errors, e(t), do not have
a unit exponential distribution, they still have a unit mean
with variance = 1r•, where 1r• is the expected probability
of censoring. Lancaster and Chesher (1985) provided a test
procedure that examines whether s2 = "£.( C;/N), where s2
is the sample variance of e(t) and "E.(C;/N) is the sample
proportion of censored observations. The test statistic used
to check the second-moment restriction of e(t) has an easily
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implementable form. An ordinary least squares regression
is run in which the left-side variable is unity and the right
side consists of (e; - 1)2 - C; and all fJJ:.,;jfJej, where 9j{j =
1, . .. , k) represent the parameters of the model. The test is
computed as the sample size, N, multiplied by the uncentered
R2 and has an asymptotic x2 (1) distribution under the null.

2.

DATA AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

The sample comprises firms listed on the New York or
American stock exchanges that were targets of tender of
fers during the period 1978- 1985. The year 1978 is a natural
starting point for the analysis because the rules governing the
Williams Act were revised in late 1977. The target firm and
Schedule 140-1 filing data were identified from the S.E.C.
News Digest, which is published on each working day. A
Schedule 140-1 form has to be filed by the bidder with the
S.E.C. prior to the commencement of the tender offer. The
public announcement date for the tender offer was identi
fied from the Wall Street JourTUJl Index (WSn). This date
typically coincides with the Schedule 140-1 filing date but
in some cases precedes it. The starting date for the contest
is the Schedule 140-1 filing date or the date of the public
announcement according to the wsn, whichever is earlier.
Furthermore, the wsn was scanned beyond the starting date
to record the occurrence/dates of any ofthe following events:
A.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Intervening Events
One or more forms of target management resistance
Interventions by regulatory authorities
Competing bids by third parties
Enhanced bids by original bidder

B. Final Outcomes
1. Target firm gets taken over
2. Target firm remains independent
The ending date for the contest is recorded based on the

wsn article summary indicating that the requisite number
of shares were tendered. If forward scanning in the wsn for
52 weeks did not result in recording a definitive outcome, the
target firm was classified as remaining independent. This is
an example of right censoring explained in Section 1.
All14D-1 filings do not necessarily constitute contests for
corporate control. In some cases the tender offer might be
for less than a controlling interest or target management may
remain passive or even acquiesce in the takeover bid. Such
tender offers are not included in our data set because our
study focuses only on contests for corporate control. Our
sample consists of 152 target firms of which 25 durations
are censored. Table 1 provides a frequency distribution of
contest durations. Note that, of the uncensored durations,
most firms were taken over in the 5-10 week interval.
The data set also includes information on the following
explanatory variables that are employed in the analysis:
Target Management Actions
1. Legal defense takes value 1 if target management
responds with a lawsuit or proposes an antitakeover char
ter amendment, 0 otherwise. The choice of this variable is

Table 1.

Sample Duration Frequencies (N = 152)

Duration times ( t)
in weeks

0 < t::; 5
5<
10 <
15 <
20 <
25 <
30 <
35 <
40 <
45 <

t::; 10
t :S 15

t::; 20
t::; 25
t::; 30
t S 35
t S 40
f $ 45
t::; 50
t > 50

115

No. offirms
taken over

16
59
25
13
6
3
1
3
1

0
25

due to the Jarrell (1985) study. Jarrell concluded that target
managements appear to take a value-maximizing gamble by
engaging in legal defensive activity. If the filing of a law
suit, or the threat to do so, creates a delay in the tender-offer
process, this will have a negative influence on the hazard.
2. Real restructuring takes value 1 if target management
proposes some change in the asset structure, 0 otherwise.
3. FiTUJncial restructuring takes value 1 if target manage
ment proposes some change in the ownership structure, 0
otherwise.
The two variables just cited were originally characterized
by the Dann and DeAngelo ( 1988) study. This study strongly
indicted target management for entrenchment behavior. If
this type of defensive activity is credible, it is expected to
exert a negative effect on the hazard.
Firm-Specific Characteristics
4. Bid premium percentage represents the percentage
excess of the first hostile-bid price over the market price of
the firm's stock 14 working days prior to the tender-offer an
nouncement. The idea is to select a time frame that allows
for information leakage prior to the public announcement; the
precedent for 14 days was set by Walkling (1985), who em
ployed a logit model to predict takeover success. We expect
this variable to positively influence the hazard. Our reason
ing is that a high initial bid leaves target management less
room to maneuver.
5. InstitutioTUJl holdings percentage serves as a proxy for
stockholder independence [or as a converse to insider hold
ings; see Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988)] . Defensive ac
tions by management may be more closely monitored in firms
with a higher percentage ofinstitutional owners. The percent
age of institutional holdings to total outstanding stock was
ascertained from the Standard & Poor's Stockholder Guide
and is expected to positively influence the hazard.
6. Intervention by regulatory authorities takes value 1 if
either the Federal Trade Commission or the Justice Depart
ment intervenes by way of requesting additional information
or mounting a court challenge to the tender offer, 0 otherwise.
We expect regulatory intervention to reduce the hazard.
7. Auction takes value 1 if the target firm receives at least
one enhanced bid from the original bidder or a competing
bid from a third-party bidder, 0 otherwise. The onset of an
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Table 2.

Sample Characteristics (N

Variables
Duration in weeks ( t)
Censoring variable (C)
Legal defense
Real restructuring
Financial restructuring
Initial bid premium
Institutional holdings
Regulation
Auction

Mean
18.086
.835
.480
.190
.177
1.303
.254
.250
.868

Std. dev.
16.65
.37
.50
.39

.38
.18
.18
.43

.33

= 152)
Min.
2.85
0
0
0
0
.88
0
0
0

Table 3.
Max.
52

1
1.95
.90
1
1

auction process is ex pected to exert a positive influe nce on
the hazard.
In Table 2, we present descriptive statistics of all the vari
ables used in the analysis.

3. MODEL FITTING AND SPECIFICATION TESTS
In this section we re port results of specification tests,
described in Section I, sequentially carried out on three mod
els. Maxtmum like)ihood estimates of all mode ls are obtained
using the MAXLIK module of the GAUSS programming lan
guage. The model is first estimated using the Wei bull mode l,
and the corresponding gra ph used for evaluating this model
is gi ven in Figure I . Note that the focus should be on depar
tures from the 45° line for smaller values of the generalized
residuals. In general, as Kiefer ( 1988) reported, the accu
racy of the product-limit esti mator of the survivor function is
better for shorter durati ons because inferences about longer
durations are based on fewe r observations. Consequently, the
top ri ght part of the graph is of negligible importance. The
graphical test of the We i bull mode l suggests considerable de
partures from the 45° line for the re levant, lower left port ion

Test Statistics Under Alternative Model Specifications
Alternative
Second moment restriction test

Null

Weibull
Log-logistic
Weibull-gamma

NotWeibull
Not log-logistic
Not Weibull-gamma

i 5

Weibull-gamma
Weibull-gamma

0

51.97
21.38

(p
(p

=.00)
= .00)

of the graph (see Fig. I). Furthermore, the formal test for the
second-moment restric tion clearly indicates misspecification
(see Table 3).
The Weibull model is clearly inappropriate, which could
be simply because the Wei bull d istribution is restrictive and
allows only for monotonic hazard rates. For instance, the a
estimate of the Wei bull model is 1.23, wh ich implies a hazard
function that continuously increases over time. This impli
cation is counterintuitive because the proba bility of takeover
ought to decline beyond some reasona ble point in time. Some
takeover bids will eventuall y fail eithe r due to antitrust con
siderations or because, given e nough time, a determined tar
get management wi ll implement defensive measures that are
not in the bidder's interest to overcome. The intuition is
fu rther supported by the fact that most firms in our sample
either were taken over within a relatively short period of time
or re mained independent (see Table I).
To search fo r a more appropriate mode l, p.{ X) can be
written as
p.( X) = exp(X{J + U) = V exp( X{J).

(3 . 1)

where V can be thought of as a proxy for omitted regressors
or, more generally, some intrinsic randomness in the model.
The survivor function for a Weibull model is
(3.2)

).

~

Because Vis not observable, the survivor function conditional
only on X is

+

"

...

= .00)
(p = .02)
(p =.14)
(p

NOTE: The p '" parentheses refers to the p value ol the lest slalisl ics. which are all dis·
tribuled x 2(1) undarthe null.

'C

ia:

26.22
5 .54
2.22

Likelihood ratio test

Weibull
Log-logistic

S(t; X, V) = exp(- V exp(X ,/3)t0
6

Test Statistic

S(t; X)=
4

c

~c 3
"...
"
0;.

"E 2

"'"

~1

J

exp(- V exp(X{J)t")p (V) d V.

Once the mi xing distribution p(V) is specified, S(t; X) is com
puted to estimate the parameters of the mode l.
Several authors (Lancaster 1979; Vaupel, Manton, and
Stallard 1979; among others) used the gamma distribution
as a convenient m ixing distribution. If p(V) represents the
density function of a gamma variate with a unit mean and
variance = CT2 , then

S(t; X)= [ I + CT2 exp( X,6 )t 0

0
0

2

4

6

Gi!neraliz.ed Residuals

Figure 1. Graphical Test for Weibu/1 Specification. Departures
from the straight line, especially at the lower left portion of the graph,
imply misspecification.

(3.3)

r

1

1"

2
•

(3.4)

The corresponding hazard and the density functi ons are
derived si mi larly. Note that the preceding function (3.4)
collapses to the Wei bull survivor function ( 1.2) for CT 2 ....... 0.
Once again it is stressed that the mixi ng distribution is used
not only to compensate fo r omitted regressors but also to cor
rect for an overly restrictive Wei bull hazard function. More
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for the log-logistic model and
4.5

.,

4

..."

3.5

"iii

...~
C>

/

3

t:

~Jr· •

"'
~ 25
""'

"":s

-

~

2

;>

"E 1.5

"

rll

.s

1
0.5
0

~----+-----~--~

2

0

3

4

5

Generallz.ed Residuals

=(1/0' )ln(l + 0'1 exp(Xp)t")
2

(3.6)

for the Wei bull-gamma model. The correspOnding residuals,
obtained by evaluating the preceding equations at their maxi
mum likelihood estimates, are used to implement the tests
described in Section 1. Graphical tests conducted on both
the log-logistic and the Weibull-gamma models indicate a
marked improvement over the Wei bull model (see the relevant
portions ofFigs. 2 and 3 ). The second-moment restriction test
supports the Weibull- garnma model, however, whereas the
log-logistic model is rejected at a 5% significance level (see
Table 3). The likelihood ratio tests, computed by taking twice
the difference between the maximized log-likelihood values
of the null and the alternative models, are also computed.
The results for the Weibull and log-logistic models in which
the alternative specification is Weibull-gamma corroborate
the finding that the Weibull-gamma model is appropriate
(see Table 3).

Figura 2. Graphical Test lor Log-Logistic Specification. Depar
tures from the straight line, especially at th8 low8r left portion of th8
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS
graph, Imply mlsspeclffcation.

over, a Weibull-gamma model specializes to a log-logistic
model (0'2 =.l). Such a model may be appropriate for the
problem that we address because the hazard function of a
log-logistic distribution declines for sufficiently large T. One
would intuitively expect firms to be less susceptible to being
taken over if they can successfully ward off the raider for a
reasonably long period of time.
Graphical and second-moment restriction tests are based
on the generalized errors, t:, where

The results of the three estimated models are presented
in Table 4. We observe that the legal defense, financial
restructuring, institutional holdings, and auction variables
are statistically significant at a 10% level (or better), with
the coefficient signs being in the hypothesized direction,
in all the models we estimate. The basic difference be
tween the three model specifications seems to be in terms
of the behavior of the hazard over time. As discussed in
Section 3, the Weibull-gamma specification provides the
best fit.
Tabla 4. Hazard-Function Estimates Under Alternative
Model Specifications

(3.5)

Variable
Constant

Legal defense

j 2.5
e: 2

r

Real restructuring

't

Financial restructuring

C>

§

~ 1.5 ...
..."

Bid premium

~

Institutional holdings

"E

"

rll

~

2

3

C.eneralized Residuals

Figure 3. Graphical Test lor Waibull-<3amma Specification. DB·
partures from th8 straight line, BSpecial/y at the lower left portion of
the graph, Imply mlsspecffication.

- 1.7959
(.4976)

- 1.7136
(.9291)

.0778
(.5080)
1.2146
(.5261)

.4994
(.7929)

.0175
(1 .6663)

1.5555
(.8336)

3.0437
(1 .7108)
- .3839
(.8193)

.0133
(.2117)

Auction

1.3664
(.3542)

- .1258
(.3329)
2.0503
(.5393)

Q

1.2316
(.0834)

2.0815
(.1540)

t

0

- 1.3655
(.3231)

Regulation

'"7 0 5 •
0

Weibull Log-logistic Weibull-gamma
- 4.8368
- 7.4899
- 14.4614
(.7908)
(1 .2881)
(3.2632)
-.3844
- .8192
- 1.3734
(.1973)
(.3128)
(.7160)
- .4285
.1302
1.0643
(.2493)
(.4175)
(.8659)

u2

Log-likelihood value

- 197.092

-181 .793

NOTE: Standard errors are In parentheses; o and
hazard models.

e1 2

2.2887
(1 .3169)
6.3359
(1 .3795)
6.7926
(1 .8875)
- 171.105

are the shape parameters d the
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0.12
0.1

i 0.08
:X:

i 0.06
~

f

0.04
0.02
0

+--------T--------+-------~

0

20

40

60

Duration In Weeks

Figure 4. Simulated Weibuii-Gamma Hazard Function. The haz
ard function for durations ranging from 1to 52 weeks is derived using
parameter estimates and regressors evaluated at mean values.

The shape parameters, a and u 2 , for the estimated Wei bull
gamma model are both found to be statistically significant at
any reasonable level, indicating that the data exhibit duration
dependence. Note that u 2 is significantly different from 0
as well as I, confirming that the alternate models, Weibull
and log-logistic, are both inappropriate. The parameter esti
mates of the Wei bull-gamma model are used to simulate the
aggregate hazard function (see Fig. 4) evaluated at the mean
value of the regressors. The firms are at no risk during the
first 20 days due to the current notice-period requirements
established by the S.E.C. Note that our data reflect this le
gal requirement because the simulated aggregate hazard in
Figure 4 is effectively 0 for weeks I and 2. Thereafter, the
hazard rises sharply, peaks at about the seventh week, and
then declines steadily. The steep rise in the hazard func
tion beyond the third week can perhaps be attributed to the
informational free-rider problem discussed by Easterbrook
and Fischel (1981). A certain amount of search cost has to
be incurred, to identify undervalued firms (targets), by the
initial bidder. Since the takeover bid i~ required by S.E.C.
regulations to be publicly announced, the target firm becomes
vulnerable to all potential bidders, not just the initial bidder.
The data, however, appear to suggest that, if target manage
ment can withstand the early weeks of the contest, the risk
of being taken over declines over time. Professional man
agers often do not have a large ownership stake in the firm
they manage and hence the contest is typically waged us
ing corporate funds. Conversely, the bidder, using external
resources, clearly has to take time-value considerations into
account and therefore is at a disadvantage if the contest is
prolonged.
Besides bidders and targets, the nature of the hazard
function is likely to be of interest to other constituencies as
well. Regulators from the S.E.C. are responsible for drafting

and enforcing rules relating to notice and waiting periods in
tender offers, the withdrawal time allowed to stockholders
and so forth. These rules are designed, within the frame
work of the Williams Act, to permit target-firm stockholders
to make informed decisions when confronted with a tender
offer. For instance two of the salient rules currently govern
ing tender offers are (1) the tender offer must remain open
for at least 20 business days from commencement of the ten
der offer and for 10 business days from the date the bidder
first gives notice of increase in the offered consideration, and
(2) any person who has deposited securities may withdraw
them any time until the expiration of 15 business days from
the date ofcommencement ofthe tender offer and in the event
of a competing tender offer within 10 business days follow
ing the date ofcommencement of the competing offer. In our
opinion, it may be helpful to the S.E.C. to use a hazard-model
approach in framing the appropriate rules.
Furthermore, risk arbitrageurs are interested in cashing out
their positions at the optimal point in the takeover contest so
as to maximize returns. It is likely that target-firm stock price
will be highest when the instantaneous takeover probability
(or hazard) is at a maximum. In our sample, the optimal
cash-out point would have been seven weeks into the contest,
on average. Investors could estimate an individual hazard
function once a contest gets underway and make their timing
decisions accordingly.
We turn next to a discussion of the variables that influence
the relative probabilities of firms getting taken over at a given
point in time. Of the variables that capture post-bid defensive
actions by management, the legal defense and financial re
structuring (proposed changes in ownership structure either
via a self-tender or a new security issue) variables are both sig
nificant at 10% levels. Because the coefficients on these vari
ables are negative, they both mitigate the hazard and prolong
the contest. The latter finding is broadly supportive of those
reported by Dann and DeAngelo ( 1988), who reported signif
icantly negative abnormal returns to target-firm stockholders
around managerial resistance announcements. This has been
interpreted in the literature as the market's downward revision
of the probability that the takeover will go through. The real
restructuring actions variable (proposed purchases or sales of
assets) is found to be insignificant, however.
The bid-premium percentage variable is insignificant,
suggesting that the initial bid premium has no influence on
the contest duration. Walkling (1985), however, using a logit
model, reported that the bid premium does have a signif
icant influence on takeover probability. Although we use
Walkling's approach in measuring the bid-premium percent
age, our approach is not directly comparable to the Walkling
study for several reasons. First, the logit methodology ig
nores the time element in takeover contests. Furthermore,
Walkling considered both contested and uncontested ten
der offers, but we only study the former. Finally, we do
not include any bidder characteristics (such as percentage of
bidder-controlled shares or solicitation fees) in our set of re
gressors, due primarily to data limitations, but instead focus
on various forms of target-management resistance. Note that
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prior studies (cited by Walkling) also found that the initial
bid premium does not play a significant role in the outcome
of the contest.
The insignificance of the bid premium is perhaps due to
the onset of an auction, which swamps the impact of the
initial bid. We find that the auction variable is significant
at a 10% level. Because the auction variable has a positive
effect on the hazard, the duration of the contest is lower for
a firm that receives multiple bids. Clearly, once an auction
process gets underway, the offer price is bid up and target
management feels stockholder pressure to accept the highest
bid. In general, if the takeover goes through, incumbent
management is replaced. It is important to note, however,
that in some instances target management seeks an auction
by pursuing a "white knight" strategy. In this context, from
management's perspective the hazard is a dilution of, rather
than a loss of, control.
The coefficient on the institutional holdings percentage
variable is positive and significant at the 10% level. This
conforms to the view that institutional holders generally exer
cise a monitoring influence on incumbent management which
arguably translates into pressure to accept an attractive tender
offer. Surprisingly, regulatory intervention does not appear
to influence the hazard. Normally one would expect that an
antitrust objection by the Justice Department would reduce
the chances of the takeover going through. A possible ex
planation for this lies in the fact that most of the contests
in our sample occurred in the 1980s, a period during which
the Justice Department was widely perceived as adopting a
laissez-faire attitude to corporate restructuring activity.

5.

CONCLUSION

Previous empirical studies in the area of corporate con
trol have generally focused on measuring stockholder wealth
e ffects for the firms involved; see Jensen and Warner ( 1988)
for a summary of the evidence. In this article, we take
a different approach. We employ duration models to esti
mate the hazard function for firms that are targets of hostile
takeover bids. Our model search, based on graphical as
well as formal specification tests, suggests that the Weibull
gamma model is appropriate for our application.
The estimated hazard function for the chosen model shows
that the probability of takeover increases sharply following
the initial bid, peaks at seven weeks, and tails off thereafter.
This could have policy implications with respect to the time
frames adopted by the S.E.C. for notice/waiting periods for
tender offers. This result could also be of interest to risk
arbitrageurs in terms of their investment timing decisions.
We also study the influence of various defensive actions
by management and target-firm characteristics on the hazard.
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We find that legal defense and financial restructuring are ef
fective in reducing the hazard, thus prolonging the contest.
As regards target-firm characteristics, the onset ofan auction
process and the monitoring influence ofinstitutional investors
apparently creates pressure on incumbent management to ca
pitulate.
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